Abslract. The article considers the possibility that asset prices might deviate from intrinsic values based on market fundamentals. Three broad categories of theory are surveyed: (a) growing bubbles (b) fads and (c) information bubbles. 'Sunspot' theories are also discussed. The paper covers both theory and evidence, and directions for future research are discussed.
l. Introduction
The possibility that asset prices might deviate from intrinsic values based on market fundamentals, because of 'speculative bubbles' or 'fads', has long intrigued economists. Recent theory and empirical research has helped to clarify whether bubbles and fads are rational and whether they occur. This work merits a review because it is increasingly sophisticated, voluminous, and controversial.
In this review, theories of price deviations from intrinsic value will be divided into three categories (somewhat arbitrarily) growing bubbles, fads, and information bubbles. 'Sunspot' theories will also be described, briefly.
Growing bubbles are typically constant terms which arise in solutions to difference equations that govern equilibrium prices. Such bubbles can occur even when traders act rationally and have rational expectations (e.g. Hahn, t966; Blanchard and Watson, 1982; Tirole, 1982 Tirole, , 1985 , unless a market is known to be limited by asset life, or by the wealth or number of traders.
Fads are mean-reverting deviations from intrinsic value caused by social or psychological forces like those that cause fashions in political beliefs or consumption goods (Shiller, 1984) , or like Keynes's'animal spirits'. If fads are slowly mean-reverting, they are 'near-rational' since traders u'ould have to wait a long time to exploit their knowledge that prices are in a fad.
Information bubbles occur when prices depart from intrinsic values based on all available information, because information is not perfectly aggregated by market prices (e.g. Friedman and Aoki, 1986 ), or because agents have different beliefs about how the economy works.
The purpose of these three categories is to organize a large, rapidly growing literature in ways that suggest productive avenues for further research. The review has several other purposes: to compare theory and evidence (the two are often somewhat separated); to draw out the economic intuition behind technical 0950-080418e/01 0003-38 $02.50/0 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS Vol.3. No. I O 1989 C. Camerer theory and subtle empirical work; and to clarify confusion about bubbles and fads. I I offer the usual apology for omitring important details or enrire papers. Some are no doubt neglected because of ignorance. Others are omirted because rhey distract the readeri this review is meant as an approximate road map for the touring economist, not a precise map for the native economist.
Theory and evidence of rational growing bubbles are discussed in Sections 2 and 3. Fads are discussed in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 describes research on information bubbles. The review is summarized in Section 7, w,ith an emphasis on unsolved problems and future research.
Rational growing bubbles: Theory
Macro-economic theorists were the frrst to rhoroughty formalize the possibiliry of growing bubbles, noting that dynamic models of the price level could have indeterminate explosive solutions even if agents have rational expecrations (Samuelson, 1958; Hahn, 1966; Sargenr and Wallace, l973a,b; Brock, 1g74, 1975 : Black, 1974 Calvo, 1978; Wallace, l9g0; Diba and Grossman, l9gga , and see Shiller, 1978 , for a review). Explosive solutions are considered anomalous in models of the general price level, but they may be good posirive theories of some episodes in asset pricing.
To see most simply2 how rational growing bubbles can occur, consider an asser in fixed supply which lives forever, and pays a dividend D, in period r (which can be stochastic). Ignore the possibility that trading is motivated by differences in beliefs or the desire for insurance (see Hirshleifer, 1975; Tirole, l9g2) . Suppose all traders are risk-neutral, have an identical discount rate of r per period, and have identical informarion /, in period r. Then the frrst-order condition in aqents, maximization of intertemporal utility (rhe .Euler equarion') isl P,= IE(D,*r I /,) + E(Pt,rl I,)l/(l + r) Intuitively, condition ( I ) implies that the price of the asser today is the discounted sum of the expected dividend and resale price next period. (The expecrarion is statistical, conditioned on the information set [,, though agents, actual expectations could possibly violate the principles of rationaliry correct expectations should satisfy.) An arbitrary bubble in prices sarisfies rhis equilibrium condition as long as the bubble in time r (on the left-hand side) equals the expected discounted bubble in time l + I (on rhe righr-hand side). Equilibrium is therefore sarisfred by bubbles Bt of the form (l) or where zr is a random term rational bubbles of this sort Bt = E(8,*, )/(l + r), Bt+t: (l + r)8, + z, with zero mean and no must grow every period, (2) (2',) autocorrelation. Note that at a rate r (hence the term E(Pr+ r (l -L-'ll + r) | l,) = E(Dt*zl I,)/(l + r). Now we can multiply both sides by (l -L-'/l + r)-r, which is | + L-'/{t *r) +.-.L-n +... (by the usual expansion of (l + x)-'), to get BUBBLES AND FADS IN ASSET PRICES 'growing bubbles'), because a bubble must provide some return to sustain participation in it.
Requiring expectations to be rational creates a difference equation in expecrations which has two solution components, an arbitrary bubble and the discounted expected value. Formally, rationality of expectations forces E(P,*tl I,*r) to be EIE(D.*zllt*r)* E(P,*zll,*r)ll')l/(l +r) (by extending equation (l) to prices in period r + I and taking an expectation). The law of iterated expectations (Sargent, 1979, pp. 208,213) reduces E(E(P,*zl t,*,; | /,) to E(P,.2I /,). Define a lag operator L, such that L(X,'l= X,-r and L-I (X,)= X,,r. Then the rational expectation condition is a difference cquation, E(P'*rl E(D,+i+ r I l,)l(l + r)' * E(Br*r), (3',) just (3")
The bubble term arises{ because B, times (l -L,/l + r) is zero if B, = B,*tll + r Uust as an arbitrary constant arises in solving a differential equation.) Putting the expected price E(P,*rl I') from (3") back into (l), we get E(D,,il I,)/(l + r\' + Bt Thus, the rational price must equal an'intrinsic value',5 the discounted dividend stream, and a bubble term (which can be zero, of course).
Growing bubbles are consistent with rational expectations, and hence with the hypothesis that markets are informationally efficient, because current prices reflect the discounted price of the future bubble. Traders cannot make excess profits by knowing prices will be too high next period, because the price is too high this period also. lndeed, because expected profits from the bubble are zero, risk-neutral traders have no strong incentive to participate in it. Risk-averse traders will not.
Rational bubbles must be grown at a rate r (in expected terms) each period, but they need not grow exactly at that rate. For instance, the bubble could be expected to burst with probability p each period, as long as the bubble in period r+ [, conditional on not bursting , is (l + r\B,l(l -p) so that the expected growth rate is still r (see Blanchard, 1979; Blanchard and Watson, 1982) .6 The probability that a stochastic bubble lives n periods is (l -p)'. This probability converges to zero as n grows large, so bubbles can exist even though rational traders know they will 'eventually' burst.
The possibility of rational growing bubbles does not depend on the restrictive assumptions required to derive (3). Tirole (1982) shows that heterogeneous information among traders and restrictions on short-selling do not affect the general possibility of bubbles. If discount rates differ across traders or time, appropriate generalizations of the solution (3) hold. If traders are risk-averse, /,)= I i= I (3) Pr= I i= I CAMERER bubbles can still exist but they must grow faster than I + r (if they are stochastic), effectively paying traders a risk premium in expected value to hold the asset (Blanchard and Watson, 1982, pp. 297 -298) . However, the bubble componenr of price may not be negative, since then a growing bubble would eventually make the asset price negative; anticipating such an occurrence will choke off negative bubbles before they start. (Of course, the bubble may grow ar a negative rare in some periods, when it bursts for instance, or in all periods if the discounr rate r is negative.) Tirole ( 1982 Tirole ( , 1985 suggested what kind of assets that might be subject to price bubbles. Assets must be durable, because an expectation of resale value is needed to generate a bubble. Scarcity or short-run supply inelasticiry is important because an asset that can be easily produced if a bubble occurs (like similar paintings by a living artist) will drive prices down and bursr the bubble. Bubbles may also require an active market for assets, and a social mechanism for coordinating the common belief that a bubble exists and will.conrinue ro grow. Blanchard and Watson (1982) pointed out that growing bubbles can have harmful real effects on the economy, by drawing out inefficient supply at high prices or making asset prices poor signals (see also Friedman, 1984) . Some argue that bubbles harm welfare because they redistribute wealth, but random redistribution is only harmful if traders are risk-averse, and risk-averse traders will avoid a bubble which grows ar rate r.
Some examples of growing bubbles
The most famous example of a growing bubble is the 'tulip mania' in Holland in the 1600's (Posthumous, 1929; Mackay, 193211974) , Tulip bulbs began selling for high prices, for no apparent reason (except rumors of increased demand in France by women who attached them to gowns). Prices rose dramatically, trading became feverish, and prices eventually crashed. Many bulb prices can be explained by the thinness of the market for novel, exoric rypes of bulbs, but the trade in common bulbs in January 1637 seems to be a bubble. The hallmark of the rational growing bubble is that traders realize prices are much higher than intrinsic values, but they buy assets anyway, expecring prices to go even higher. Historical accounts of part of the tulip mania bear this hallmark (see Garber, 1986 , for a thorough description).
A bubble in modern times is the price of 'yearling' thoroughbreds, year-old horses that have never raced (Barron's 1985; Crist, 1986) .{n the 1970's prices for top-quality yearlings at prestigious auctions began to rise, to a mean of nearly 5500,000 (with a maximum price of Sl3.l million in the mid-1980's). These prices seem quite high because half of the most well-bred yearlings never win any races and only 290 become champion money-winners (Phitadetphia Inquirer, 1984) . Very few horses earn a million dollars from racing (none of the 150 or so milliondollar yearlings ever have). The source of the apparent bubble is breeding potential, not racetrack earnings: Yearlings can make more yearlings (up to 50 times a year), earning large 'stud fees' of up to $l million each time. The BUBBLES AND I.ADS IN ASSET PRICES possibility of reproduction creates an equilibrium condition berrveen the price paid for a yearling today (I',) and the expected sales of the yearling's offspring tomorrow (E(Yr*r)), much like the equilibrium condition (l) for stock prices, which allows rational bubbles to form.
Of course, rational growing bubbles tend to burst, and yearling prices have indeed fallen from their peak in 1983-4. (The price decline may have been softened when an organization of breeders, who benefrt rnost from a bubble, began to increase purses enormously in 1984, arguably to boost intrinsic value closer to prices and prevenr rhe bubble from bursting. s )
Even with yearlings it is diffrcult to tell whether prices are in a bubble above intrinsic value because unobservable components of value, like tax advantages or prestigee, could justify very high prices for unraced horses. Or the tulip and yearling bubbles might have been irrational Ponzi schemes created by specularors (cf. Kindleberger, 1978) , as in modern 'pyramid' or 'aeroplane' games.r0 These competing explanations, whether plausible or not, show how hard it is to tell whether price movements are due to rational growing bubbles.
Another controversial example is the dramatic growth and crash of silver prices during 1980 (from $10 to $50 per ounce and back again). The typical accounr is that the Hunt brothers bought up silver contractsrr to limit supply and'squeeze the rhorts' i.e. force sellers obligated to deliver silver to buy ir at high prices (see Abolafia and Kilduff, 1988) . Fama and French (1988b) , noting that silver prices behaved no more strangely than other metals prices, suggest the apparent squeeze is consistent with the theory of storage underlying models of futures prices.
Ruting out growing bubbles
The short history of formal theory about growing bubbles is an intellectual struggle between attempts to rationalize the possibility of bubbles, because rhey may occur, and attempts to rule out bubbles because they are arbitrary.
Bubbles cannot occur if expectotions are adoptive
One way to rule out bubbles is to assume expectations are not rational, since rhe possibility of growing bubbles is directly traceable to rhe assumption of rational expectations. Under rational expectations, price paths are indeterminate because there are two variables to solve for each period, prices and expectations, but there is only a single condition constraining market equilibrium and rationality of expectations (Flood and Garber, 1982) .
If expectations are adaptive rather than rational, bubbles can usually be ruled out. For instance, if E(Prl lt-t) is simply equal to P,-2, it is easy to show thar prices will converge to the discounted dividend level, for any value of the initial expecration E(P1//o) (see also Lucas, 1986) . Burmeister (19g0) made the dual argument that adaptiveness in price adjustment, instead of adaptiveness in expectation adjustment, will preclude divergent paths in macroeconomic models. 
Methodological reasons for ruling out bubbles
Many macroeconomists have proposed methodological reasons for excluding bubble paths. McCallum (1983) suggested that indeterminate price parhs be ruled out on grounds of parsimony. Gourieroux, Laffont, and Monfort (1982) discussed criteria for excluding price paths based on statistical and economic properties. Taylor (1977) noted that bubbles in the general price level are inconsistent with the collective rationality of price-variance minimizarion, but he proposes no way for traders to achieve collective rationality.r2 2.2.3. Economic reasons for ruling out bubbles Brock (1978) argued that bubbles in the general price level are ruled out by individual utility maximization, provided real money balances (M/P) times the marginal utility of real balances stays positive as M/P approaches zero. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) show that this requirement is economically unrealistic because it implies that the utility of zero real balances is negatively infinire, as if no amount of consumption could compensate a person for doing without money. (Gray, 1984 , reviewed these arguments lucidly.) However, Rogoff (1983, 1986 ) also showed that bubbles are ruled out if the government probabilistically guarantees a minimal redemption value for currency in units of capitalt3 lseealso Wallace, 1981, and Brock, 1982) . Implosive bubbles (in which prices asymptote to zero) are ruled out if the utility of real balances is bounded from above (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1986) . Farmer (1984) showed that hyperinflationary equilibria can be ruled out if units of consumption have a minimum size D. Since a hyperinflation would eventually make a fixed money stock worth less than D, and hence worthless, by backward induction no hyperinflation can be sustained. lsaac (1986) pointed out that assuming a minimum unit of consumption can preclude existence of stationary equilibria or introduce cyclical indeterminacies, but assuming trading costs rules out hyperinflations, just as minimum consumption does, without causing other complications. Grossman (1987, 1988b) noted that a rational bubble cannot begin at any arbitrary date ,t in the middle of an asset's life, because rational traders must have anticipated the bubble's beginning, so a bubble must, have occurred at time t* -l, etc. Rational bubbles must therefore start at the inception of an asset's life (which seems empirically implausible), unless we allow unanticipated shifts in collective expecrarions ro trigger bubbles.
Market limits rule out growing bubbles
In asset markets, the most obvious reasons why growing bubbles won't exist are restrictions on the scope of a market (Tirole, 1982 (Tirole, , 1985 . For instance, if assets have a finite lifetime of 7" periods, as bonds do, rational bubbles should not occur, by backward induction. In period 7" no rational trader will pay more than the terminal value of the asset, so no trader with rational expectations will pay more than the discounted terminal value in period T -l, etc. No rarional bubble can start because all traders can anticipate its ending.r{ With known wealth constraints, the bubble must stop growing at some point, and the unravelling argument again applies. (ln practice wealth constraints may nor be very important, since agents can borrow; see Tirole, 1982 Tirole, , p. 1179 .
Even if there are no limits on wealth or the life of assets, rational growing bubbles can't occur if the number of traders is frnite, if traders have rational expectations and rational trading strategies. The argument is subrler. Along rhe equilibrium bubble path, traders have no positive (or negative) incentive to buy and sell at the bubble price. However, there is a date at which each trader will leave the market to spend gains on consumption (to do otherwise would mean postponing consumption endlessly); effectively, near retiremenr rhe incentive ro buy the asset t's negative because it has an opportunity cost. r5 Since rraders will eventually depart after they have sold the asset at bubble prices, remaining traders play a negative-sum game. Anticipating this, nobody will buy initialty at a bubble price.
Removing market limits implies bubbles can occur
Rational bubbles can occur if the number of traders is infinite (with overlapping generations of traders, for instance). Then the sum of net profits to the traders who remain after some traders depart, which is negative, is divided among an infinite number of traders so the average expected profrt is zero; traders have no incentive to avoid the bubble (though they have no incenrive to join it either). Tirole (1985) showed that bubbles can occur in a model of an overlappinggenerations economy like Diamond's (1965) , if the long-run real interest rate is less than the rate of population growth. He concluded (p. 1093) thar 'we would be best advised to believe that bubbles are not inconsistent with oprimizing behavior and general equilibrium'. r6 2.2.6. Some kinds of near-rational bubbles Since the arguments above rule out rational bubbles under many conditions, but the empirical evidence reviewed below suggests bubbles do occur, it may be useful to speculate about 'near-rational' theories of bubbles (Tirole, 1982, p. I180) .
Even if the number of traders is finite, a rational bubble can occur if traders expect positive profit from participating in the bubble, even after the initial winning trader departs and leaves a negative-sum game. Expectations of positive profrt are not rational because from the perspective of the theory, which is the perspective traders must take under rational expectations, each trader is equal, so each trader should expect an equal share of the negative-sum pie. However, people tend to be unrealistically optimistic about their relative srarus or abilityrT (including trading abilityts). Optimism may be near-rational if it has psychological or biological value (Tiger, t980; Alloy and Abramson, 1979) or if people simply prefer optimistic beliefs (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982) . Optimism t0 CAMERER among a finite number of traders could cause a 'near-rarional' bubble if each trader who remains after the first trader departs does not expect his or her prohts to be negative (event though total profits must be negarive).
Even without optimism, near-rational bubbles might occur if the limits on the scope of the market are not common knowledge (Aumann, 1976) . (By analogy, in some finitely-repeated games backward induction rules our cerrain srraregies as suboptimal if the game is commonly-known, but a lack of common knowledge can make those strategies rational. See .) For instance, suppose traders all know a bubble will eventually burst, because the asset's horizon is limited, for instance, but traders are not sure whether other traders know this. We can model this uncertainty by assuming each trader i has a guess 7', about how long the others think the bubble will last. (Under common knowledge, these li's must all be zero.) [t is reasonable for i to hold the asser until just before ?",. But some unlucky trader, the one with the largest value of ?i, will be stuck with the asset when the bubble bursts. (Cf. Keynes, who called speculation 'a game of Snap, of old Maid, or Musical chairs', Keynes, 1936l1964, pp. 155-156.) This simple model resembles a 'common-value aucrion', in which an irem with a common value is auctioned to traders who have different guesses /, about what the common value is. With many bidders, the highest bidder is typically the bidder who has most overestimared the true value of the item; hence the celebrated 'winner's curse ' (wilson, 1977, Milgrom and weber, l9g2) . The unlucky trader with the largest guess ?"i about how long rhe bubble will burst (call him the 'greater fool') is like the cursed winner with the largest 2,. Their common error is a failure to realize that their inirial beliefs about ?", (or h) should be conditioned on the fact that they have been allowed to hold the asset (or win rhe auction), and revised downward.re But this error seems to be difhcult to unlearn: the winner's curse does not disappear with experience (Kagel and Levin, 1986) . Near-rational'greater fool bubbles', caused by the same error as the winner,s curse, might therefore persist when the limits of the market (or traders' rationality, Arrow, 1982) , are not commonly known. Allen and Gorton (1988) provide an interesting example of how a lack of common knowledge about a market limit can allow rational bubbles. In their simple model, it is commonly known that there are three traders, with stochastic lifetimes, who can trade an asset with a finite lifetime. (The existence of only three traders and a finitely-lived asset should rule our bubbles, by the backward induction arguments in the last section.) However, traders cannot figure out whether there are other traders left when they contemplate buying the asset (because they don't know which traders boughr the asser before them); rational bubbles can occur.
Sunspots
Arbitrary bubble paths in models of asset prices have a counterparr, called 'sunspots', in simple exchange models (see Cass and Shell, 1980; or Grandmont and Malgrange, 1986) .
BUBBLES AND FADS IN ASSET PRICES
Consider a model in which agents are endowed with a utility function on consumption and with goods (or with labour that produces goods according to some technology). tmagine an extrinsic event. called a sunspot, which has two values ('sunspot'or'no sunspot', for instance). Suppose sunspots do not affect agents' endowments, their utility functions, or the production technology, that is, sunspots don't affect any underlying variables in the simple economy. Several authors have shown that there are exchange equilibria in which goods prices do depend upon which value of the sunspot occurs, that is, sunspots do affect the economy. Equilibria in which sunspots matter may even be Pareto-dominated by equilibria in which sunspots are ignored, because risk-averse agents dislike the randomness introduced by sunspots.
Incompleteness in trading opportunities in markets is necessary for sunspots to matter: otherwise, agents can hedge against sunspot effects and those effects will disappear (e.g., Cass and Shell, 1983, proposition 3) .
ln Azariadis (1981) and Spear (1984) , sunspots can matter because there are no markets for contingent claims on sunspots. (Peck, 1988 , generalizes their results by allowing nonstarionary fundamentals.) Even if markets are complete, sunspots can matter if agents can only trade in markets after they are born:0 (Cass and Shell, 1983) . Woodford (1986) showed that even in an economy with infrnitely-lived agents, sunspots can matter if agents can only frnance spending from money or by borrowing against current capital, because such an economy behaves like an economy with overlapping generations of frnitely-lived traders. Guesnerie (1986) extended the results of Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) to an arbitrary finite number of commodities. Azariadis (1981, pp. 388-390) showed how likely sunspot equilibria might be.
Markets may never be complete enough to rule out sunspots because it is diftcult to introduce enough contingent claims to span all the random events people might think are important (Cass, 1984; Azariadis, 1981, p.394) . Even if contingent claims markets are complete, Cass and Shell (1983) note that sunspots can maler if agents have different beliefs about the prior probability of sunspots.
Sunspor theories provide a formal basis for the Keynesian notion that business cycles might be caused by arbitrary, self-fulfrlling betiefs (see Grandmont and Malgrange, 1986) . Calculations in Woodford (1986, p. 135 ) suggest sunspotinduced business cycles are roughly the size of actual business cycles. Woodford (pp. 136-7\ and Crandmonr (1986) showed how government fiscal and budgetary policy can eliminate sunspots. Sunspot theories have not been directly applied to asset pricing, though the formal resemblance to rational growing bubbles is obvious (Tirole, 1985, footnote 22) .
Widespread attention to money-supply figures or pronouncements of famous forecasters like Henry Kaufman (whose accuracy is suspect, see Business Week, 1983), could be sunspots. Traders often say they know these announcements contain no information, but they expect them to affect prices, and their beliefs are self-fulfrlled. (Cass, 1984 , called the overreaction of financial markets to unimportant news the 'leading example' of sunspot equilibrium.)
Even these examples may not be pure sunspots in which beliefs are entirely il t2 CAMERER arbirrary. [t is more Iikely that some traders mistakenly believed the sunspots did affect fundamentals and traded accordingly. Then other traders learned that sunspors affected prices; their latter belief persisted, fulfilling itself, even after the mistaken initial beliefs were corrected. (For instance, Kaufman had a remarkable record of predictions in the early 1980's; then he regressed toward the forecaster's mean and became a sunspot.) Sunspot-type theories of goods prices should apply fairly directly to assets which yield streams of consumption (housing or art, for instance). The application might prove interesting since sunspots can exist in finite-horizon models (Cass, 1984) where growing bubbles cannot.
3. Rational growing bubbles: Evidence 3.1. Direct estimates of growing bubbles ln theory, one can esrimate directly whether growing bubbles exist in a time series of asset prices by simply testing a specification which includes a growing bubbte term. Flood and Garber (1980) were the first to do this, testing the joint hypothesis of deterministic bubbles and Cagan-type money demand (as a determinant of 'market fundamentals'), using data from the German hyperinflation of the 1920's. They accepted the no-bubble hypothesis at conventional levels.
One problem wirh their pioneering test is that results of asymptotic distribution theory do not appty when regressors are exponentially growing (as their hypothesized bubble was). The problem is reduced if a simultaneous bubble is estimated in data from several countries. Using data from Poland, Hungary, and Germany, Flood, Garber, and Scott (1984) rejected the no-bubble hypothesis by likelihood-ratio tests, but the results of t-tests were ambiguous (they depended on what value of the bubble coefficient was used to calculate the estimate standard error). Burmeister and Wall (1982) used Kalman hltering so that stochastic bubbles were permitted, and they strongly reject the no-bubble hypothesis.
Another problem with these tests is that money supply is assumed to be exogeneous in these tests, i.e. market fundamentals, controlled by government policy, are assumed to be independent of a bubble. Burmeister and Wall (1987) concluded that money supply growth was not exogeneous, but they still reject the no-bubble hypothesis with corrected tests. Woo (1984) , Okina (1985) , and Borensztein (1987) estimated bubble terms directly in a ponfolio balance model of exchange rates, using deutschemarkdollar, franc-dollar, and yen-dollar rates from the 1970's and 1980's. They found significant t-statistics on most bubble term coefficients, but their significance is somewhat overstated because starting points for bubble terms were chosen by looking at the data. (The test statistics may also be unreliable because of the growing regressor problem.)
Because of the statistical problem associated with direct estimates of explosive bubbles, West (1987) devised a robust specification test (as in Hausman, 1978) .
Roughly speaking, west uses instrumental variables to rate r in l3 estimate rhe discounr where P and D are stock estimates separately an relation, Pt = (P,,r * D,*t)/(l + r) + ut*t prices and dividends and u is an autoregressive dividend process Dt=dDr-r*et P1= gD1 (4) error term. Then he and a present-value If prices are equal to the discounred dividend value. then equations (5-6) implies a rheorerical relarionship berween s=dl(l+r-d)).
(5) (6) some algebra on g, d, and r (vrz., If there is no bubble, then the estimates of the paramerers g, d, and r should satisfy the theoretical relationship (except for sampling error). If there is a bubble the first estimate of r from (a) will still be 'consisrent' (it approaches rhe true value of r as the sample size gets larger), because a bubble sarisfies the equilibrium condition underlying (4). But a bubble will make the estimared value of g in (6) look much larger than it truly is (if the bubble is correlared with dividends), so the second estimate of r, calculated from the estimate of g, will be inconsistent. Therefore, if the two estimates of r are different then there is evidence of bubbles.
Using stock prices, West (1987) found srrong evidence that the esrimares of r were indeed different, suggesting the existence of a bubble that is correlated with dividends. Applying the same test to foreign exchange rates, Meese (1986) found evidence of bubbles in dollar-mark and dollar-pound exchange rares.
Flood, Hodrick, and Kaplan (1986b) gave a rhoughtful cririque of West,s resr. They note that a two-period version of (4) fits much more poorly than the oneperiod version, suggesting a slight misspecification that is compounded in longer intervals and which might account for the rejection of the no-bubble hypothesis in this test and others (see Section 5). They also found that the discounr rare r could be forecasted using lagged returns or dividend-price rarios (see also Keim and Stambaugh, 1986; Fama and French, l9g7) , suggesring west,s assumprion of a constant discount rate is wrong. west ( 1987, p. 577 -578 ) said his assumprion is adequate unless the discount rate can be forecasted using only lagged dividends. Further work on the forecastability of the discounr rate is clearlv needed.
3,2. Indirect diagnostic tests
While the direct tests for bubbles are ambitious and clever, one must necessarily test the joint hypothesis that a bubble exists along with some model of inrrinsic value. Any apparent bubble could be evidence of a variable which affects inrrinsic value but is not observed by the econometrician (Hamilton and Whiteman, 1985: Hamilton 1985) .
For example, Flood and Hodrick (1986a) gave a theoretical example of price l4 CAMERER changes, in anticipation of a switch in rhe process generating inrrinsic value, which look exactly like a growing bubble.2'This diffrculr idenrificarion problem can be circumvented if bubbles have common sraristical properties that do not depend on the specification of market fundamentals that underly intrinsic value. Hamilton and Whiteman (1985) and Diba and Grossman (1982) noted rhat deterministic rational bubbles must grow exponenrially, and no amounr of differencing of an exponentially-growing time series will make the series stationary. If it takes N differences to make the time series of market fundamentals stationary, then if prices contain a bubble the price series will still be non-starionary when differenced Ntimes. (However, euah, 19g5, and Meese, 1986 ' Table l, showed that a stochastic bubble can look starionary so rhe differencing test will not detect stochasric bubbles.) Diba and Grossman (1985) found that stock prices and dividends were both stationary when differenced once, thus ruling out the possibility that a determinisric bubble exisred throughout their sample. Meese (1986) found that exchange rares were less stationary than market fundamentals (relative money supplies and relarive real incomes), suggesting presence of a bubble. He also tesred for 'cointegrarion' (Cranger and Engle, 1987) , i.e. stationarity of a linear combinarion of rwo or more time series. tf bubbles exist, the fundamenrals and price series will not be cointegrated. They were not.
Simpler diagnostic tests might be used to look for bubbles. (However, their statistical power is limited: even if bubbles exisr, these rests might not detect them.) For instance, bubbles will cause price changes to have fewer 'runs' rhan if they were random. Insufficient runs (or posirive aurocorrelation) were indeed observed by Huang (1981 Huang ( ), okina (1985 Huang ( ), cheung (1996 , and Evans (19g6) in foreign exchange rates, and Hood et at (1985) , Lo and MacKinlay (1988) in recent stock prices; but Blanchard and Watson (1982) found the expecred number of runs in gold prices.
Since bubbles will cause some extremely large positive price changes as rhey grow (especially during the last stages of bubble growth), and even larger negarive price changes when they burst, the distribution of price changes will have negative skewness and large kurtosis if bubbles exist. 22 Large kurtosis was reported by Friedman and Vandersteel (1982) and Okina (1985) for foreign exchange rares, Dusak (1973) for commodity futures prices, Fama (1976, Chapter l) for stock prices, and Blanchard and watson (1982) for gold prices.
Evans (1986) defined a bubble as a nonzero median in the distribution of price changes, and he found such a bubble in dollar-pound exchange rates from the 1980's. (Okina, 1985 , reported skewness in exchange rate changes too.) Evans also corrected the statistical significance of his findings for deliberare .data mining' (the selection of a period to test for a bubble after observing the data); his correction could be usefully applied in many orher srudies.
These diagnostic tests for growing bubbles are inconclusive for a lot of reasons. Autocorrelation, kurtosis, or a non-zero median in a price series could be due to the market fundamentals having those staristical properties, rather than ro a bubble (e.9., Evans, t986). Tests of stationarity can derect deterministic bubbles but not stochastic ones. Short-lived stochastic bubbles will be missed entirely if prices are not sampled frequently. Despite their limits, diagnosric resrs are easy, and they may prove useful in future work for derermining whether more definitive tests are worth conducting.
Experimental evidence
Mistaking an incorrect specification of intrinsic value for a bubble can be avoided in an experiment in which intrinsic values are controtled. The benefits of control are not without cost, however, since generalizing from experiments to natural settings is always a matter of debate.
ln the 28 experimenrs of Smith, Suchanek, and williams (1988) , subjecrs traded an asset which lived for l5 periods and paid a random dividend (which was identical for all traders) to whomever held the asser ar the end of each of the l5 periods. Since the asset expired with a liquidation value, its inrrinsic value in period 7" of the experiment was its expected liquidation value plus rhe stream of l5-f periods of expecred dividends (assuming risk-neurrality).
In most experiments prices spiraled well above the intrinsic value in temporary bubbles that crashed in the last few periods. Crashes occurred earlier and earlier when experienced subjects participated in further experiments. Since rhe asset had a frnite horizon (and subjects knew this), these were nor rarional bubbles. They seem to be near-rational bubbles caused by optimism or 'greater fool' type uncertainty about other traders. [n the l2 experiments of Camerer and Weigelt (1987) , subjects traded an asset which paid a dividend D each period, and which lived from period to period with a known probability (based on drawings with replacement from a public bingo cage). If subjects were risk-neutral the probability that the asset lives after each period, p, functioned like a discount rate: Pr should equal D + pE(P'+ r ), so rational bubbles can occur (and must grow at the rate I lp on average).
Generally, prices converged slowly to the intrinsic value. In one experiment prices grew exponentially at roughly the predicted rare llp, and ex-anre price forecasts gathered from subjects showed that subjects predicted the growth in prices (i.e., their expectations were rational). That experiment is as close to a rational bubble as one can imagine. After the experimenr, Camerer and Weigelt discovered that the subjects had been in earlier market experimenrs in which the prices of a series of one-period assets rose in a steady inflation (because rhe experimenter shifted out demand and supply curves by a fixed percentage each period). Their beliefs about the growing bubble in prices were induced by previous experience, and were self-fulfrlling. 23
Fads: Theory
Prices might drift away from intrinsic values because social forces create fads or fashions in asset markets, as in markets for cars, food, houses, and entertainment. Theories of fads have a long oral history among practitioners and social scientists, especially non-economists. Interest in fads among economists cAMERER has been rekindled by the controversial research of excessive volatilitv in asser prices, described below in secrion 5.
We can define a fad as a deviation between prices and intrinsic value, F,, that slowly reverts to its mean of zero (Shiller and Perron, 1985; Summers. 1986: Lo and MacKinlay, 1988) , as in p,= Z E(D,*i)/(l + r)i + F, j= I with Ft+r=CFt+et where C is a parameter measuring the speed of convergence or decay of the fad (and er is a zero-mean, independent error term). If C = 0 any fads disappear immediately. If C = I + r the fad is a rational growing bubble as described in the last two sections. Fads are not rational because (7) does nor satisfy the equilibrium condition if C is less than one (since the expected return on rhe faddish part of the price will be less than r and invesrors should sell assers, making the fad disappear). However, if C is close to one, rhe fad may be so slow to decay that investors cannot easily profit by betting on it to disappear.
Fads in utilities, beliefs, and returns
Most of the debate about fads is purely empirical. [n future work ir may be useful to distinguish three types of fads theoretically, depending upon where faddishness is located in the discounted dividend model of stock prices.
First, prices may fluctuate because the utility people ger from holding assers varies over time, as if their psychic dividends are some function F,,(D,). Collectibles are an example (artwork, for instance), since their utility seems ro vary with cultural norms of taste.
Second, prices may fluctuate because of mass changes in beliefs about future intrinsic value (the fad creates a term F,\E(D,*r)l in the price equarion) as in informal theories of 'zeitgeist' or 'market psychology'.20 Examples of belief fads might include the South Sea (Mackay, 193211974: Schachter, et a/, 1986a) , or Mississippi bubbles (Thiers, 1859 (Thiers, /1969 , driven by unrealistic beliefs abour the prospects of English companies given exclusive rights to do business in those regions. Modern examples are the stock of Resorrs International, which boomed when Atlantic City casinos opened and crashed when profit expecrarions proved too optimistic (e.g., Dreman, 1982: 84-85) , or prices of high-technology stocks which soar when investors mistake scientific breakthroughs for financial breakthroughs (Arrow, 1982) . (Of course, calling rhese beliefs faddish afrer the fact is unfair. But extreme historical examples might be useful in suggesting theories that predict future fads.)
Third, prices might fluctuate because of fads in expected returns (as if some function F,(r) replaces the discount rate r). Indeed, since changes in expected returns are largely unrestricted by models of rational behavior, returns fads can be rational (or might represent fluctuations in perceprions of risk caused by cognitive errors or social forces; see De Bondt and Thaler, 1989, pp. 198-199) . (7) In principle, empirical tests can distinguish between types of fads. Lo and MacKinlay (1988) distinguished between returns fads and fads in prices (i.e., fads in utilities of beliefs) in stock price data. Hypothesis about propensities of each type of fad in different assets, time periods, or markets can be tested.25 Distinguishing between types of fads might also be useful in choosing a bundle of social sciences outside economics to help explain any observed fads26, or in suggesting policy tools if fads are undesirable. (Belief fads might respond to policies that change the cost of information, while utility fads respond ro taxes.)
Coordination motives and rational fads
Notice that locating faddishness in utilities or rerurns implies that fads are urilitymaximizing, and hence rational (though belief fads are not rarional). Another way to rationalize fads is suggested by a famous analogy of Keynes (1936 Keynes ( /1964 . lnvestment is like a beauty contest in which the winner is rhe person whose choice is most like the average choice. This analogy is misleading as a model of investment because the beauty contest is clearly a game of coordination: the objective is to do what others do. Investment requires doing today what others will do tomorrow, which is not the same as coordination.
However, beauty contest-type fads may persist if there is some instirutional or psychological incentive for traders to coordinate their actions. For insrance, clients often judge professional investors by the returns they earn relative to returns of competing professionals (Walt Street Journal,l986; Friedman, 1984, p. 508) . Portfolio managers are often frred if their short-rerm performance is worse than overall market performance, which dulls the appetite for the speculatibn necessary to destroy fads. tf risk-averse professionals seek to minimize the variance of their relative performance by trading as others do, then investment is a coordination game, the beauty contest is an apt analogy, and fads may persist because betting against them increases relative performance risk.
Note that for professionals facing performance risk, participating in a fad may be utility-maximizing. The irrationality comes from clienrs who are too quick to change money managers based on small samples of return data (see Denton, 1985) .
Individual investors who are not professionals will also participate in a fad if they have a taste for conformity or if they care about their relative sratus and are averse toward status risks (cf. Easterlin, tg73; Frank, l9g6).
Fads: Evidence
Much of the evidence for fads comes from tests of whether asset prices are too variable to be rational forecasts of future intrinsic values.
Tests of excess volatility of asset prices
Searches for alternative tests of the rationality of asset markets have spawned a rich and contentious literature on price variance tests. Papers with useful t7 l8 CAMERER overviews include Leroy (1984) , Shiller (1984) , Kleidon (1986b) ' Merton (1987) ' and West (1988b) .
Variance tests are useful because traditional tests of 'market efhciency' (can information be used to earn excess returns?) are not very powerful for detecting long-lasting departures from rationality (Summers, 1986) . Increasing the amount of data, by using daily rather than monthly observations for instance, does not help because the number of years the data span is what matters when testing for fads (Shiller and Perron, 1985) . Variance tests are also better than conventional regression tests when data are 'misaligned' -when the sample of available stock prices are implicitly forecasting actual dividends which are not available, for instance (Shiller, l98lb , Section V). The basic idea of a 'variance inequality' or 'variance bounds' test is simple.
Suppose today's asset price pr is an unbiased forecast of the perfect foresight price pr. Then
where er is an error term. A lack of bias implies that E(pi I p,) is simply p,, or by implication of (7), E(e,l p) = 0. (That is, we expect forecast errors to be unrelated to price levels.) Thus, fu and er should be uncorrelated. If they were positively correlated, for example, then when prices were high e, would be high' so we would know prices were higher than the perfect foresight price and we could profit by selling assers. tf p, and et are uncorrelated in (7), then by taking variances of all variables, denoted V(x) (and recalling that V(x\ -V(-x)), we see that
Since variances must be positive, this equation implies an inequality involving variances, v(p,)<v(pi) tgl Actual prices should vary less than the perfect foresight prices do, because a good forecast should be regressive (less volatile) compared to the variable being forecasted. tf forecasts of snowfall or election results have some accuracy but vary more rvildly than actual snowfall or results, then we know the forecasts overreact (or 'overpredict') the events being forecasted. Present-value relations give rise to variance inequalities like (9) to test the discounted dividend theory of stock prices, the expectations theory of interest rate term structure (do long-term bond returns equal the geometric average of short-rerm returns? see Shiller, 1979; Singleton, 1980) , theories relating preferred stock dividend yields and interest rates (Amsler, 1980 ) and foreign exchange rates and money stock differentials (Huang, l98l; Meese and Singleton, l98l) ' and the permanent income hypothesis (Campbell and Deaton, 1987) .
BUBBLES AND FADS IN ASSET PRICES

Initial results
To test the variance relation (9) for stocks, researchers compared the variance of stock prices (typically using annual data beginning in l87l) to the variance of a perfect foresighr price (or ex post intrinsic value) constructed from historically realized dividends, assuming a constant discount rate. lnitial studies showed that prices of stocks were vastly more variable then the perfect foresight price (see Leroy and Porter, l98l; Shiler, l98la,b; Blanchard and Watson, 1982, pp. 13-19) . The rario of the sample standard deviations of p, and pI were around 5 to I (though (9) implies they should have been less than l). Results with bonds and exchange rates generally showed excessive volatility too.
Methodological problems
Despite the quick acceptance of findings of excessive volatility by many economists (e.g., Arrow, 1982; Ackley, 1983; Tobin, 1984) , many researchers felt the rejecrions of rationality must be due to some flaws in the tests. They found several merhodological reasons why (9) might be violated even if prices were rational forecasts of the perfect foresight price:
(l) Prices should nor necessarily equal the perfect foresight price if people are risk-averse (e.g., Leroy, 1982) . Stock prices are also more volatile under riskaversion than under risk-neutrality, so risk-aversion could conceivably account for the observed volatility of prices (Leroy and LaCivita, l98l; Michener, 1982; Flood, Hodrick and Kaplan, 1986b) . Grossman and Shiller (1981) addressed this problem by correcting discount rates for risk-aversion, using a specific model of consumprion risk (Breeden, 1979 ). (They effectively tested a specific model of returns fads.) After their correction, the perfect foresight price series pI is indeed closer to the stock price series pr until 1950, but after 1950 pt is still too volatile compared to p'i. However, Shiller (1986b, p.502 ) guessed that there is still an 'element of truth' to the returns fads explanation.
Note that time-varying changes in expected returns (perhaps due to riskaversion and variation in consumption) do not make actual prices deviate from the perfect foresight price. Instead they make the perfect foresight price calculated from a constant-return model (the pI above) deviate from the true perfect foresight price. tf prices are equal to the true p'f then they will look like they are deviating from the calculated pI intrinsic value.
(2) Flavin (1983) and Kleidon (1986a) independently noted that with small samples of data (even 100 annual observations), variance inequalities could be violated even if forecasts were rational because of small-sample bias in estimating variances.2t However, the degree of bias seems too small to explain the large violations of the variance inequality (e.9., Shiller, 1985) .
(3) If the time series of dividends or prices are non-stationary (like a random walk, for instance), then population variances simply do not exist (Kleidon, l986b, c) ; the variance inequality is meaningless. Sample variances can be calculated so the inequality (9) can be tested, but it will often be violated, even l9 if prices are rational estimates of the 1986, showed that (9) is always smoothing model of dividends as in set equal to the final price p,.) perfect foresight price. (Marsh and Merton. violated for a non-stationary managerial Lintner, 1956 , assuming the terminal pl is Whether dividends are stationary or not is thus a crucial empirical question, which is controversial and unresolved.
tt But even if dividends are non-stationary and prices are rational (so that (9) will be falsely violated), it may be unlikely that variance rarios would be as large as those Shiller and others observed. Simulation results showed that if a 590 discount rate is used, results as extreme as Shiller's could be obtained 4090 of the time; with a 6.590 rate (as in Shiller l98la), extreme results could occur l59o of the time (Kleidon, 1986b , p. 5486: Shiller, 1986b .
Since the exrremiry of the findings could conceivably be accounted for by nonstationariry, whether dividends are non-stationary remains an important question. (4) Kleidon (1986b,c) and Leroy (1984, pp. 185-6) pointed out that the most striking evidence in Shiller's tests is the choppiness of stock prices: prices lurch erratically from one year to the next, while the perfect foresight series chugs smoothly along. It seems rhat the conditional varrance of prices is greater than that of intrinsic values i.e. V(p,*nlp,) is greater than V(pi,^lpi). They showed rhat even if prices are rational forecasts, so the inequality of unconditional variances in (9) holds, for small values of n the conditional variances will be reversed (V(p,*nlp,) should be greater than V(pi,^lpi). Shiller (1979 Shiller ( , 1986a , p. 5504) conceded rhis point, but it does not change his conclusions about the results of (9).
(5) Shiller (l98lb, pp.299-300) pointed out if prices fluctuated wildly in anticipation of some extremely rare event that would change dividends drastically (e.g., world war or economic collapse), but that event didn't occur in a small sample of 100 years of data, prices might appear to be fluctuating irrationally. (This is called the'peso problem'.) However, Shiller found that the magnitude of evenr probability that would be needed to explain the volatility of prices rvas unreasonably high.
Recent results
Three recenl studies were designed to address most of the methodological problems above (especially the problem caused by dividend non-stationarity). I shall review them in some detail because they constitute the state of the art in this controversial literature.
Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro (19850 began with the identity pi -p? -(pi -P,)+(p,-p?)
where pP is a price based on any naive forecast of dividends. (They used the myopic forecast E(Dt+r) = Dr-t.) tf stock prices are rational forecasts of pl, the error term pf-p, (from the right hand side of (10)) should be uncorrelated with the naive forecast error p,-p? (also on the right hand side of (10)). If the two errors were correlated, it would imply that there was information in the difference between pP and pr that enabled the market to forecast Prr lrlot€ accuratelY, an obvious violation of rationaiitv. Since the two rerms on the right hand side of ( l0) are uncorrelated, taking variances in (10) implies two variance inequalities.
Note that non-stationarity of dividends is not a problem for this tesr, because rhe variances of pi and p, are taken around pP rather than around their sample means; the variances in (ll) and (12) will exist even if V(p,) and V(pi ) do not exist. Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro found that (ll) was violated for all reasonable discounr rates, but (12) was not violated for low discount rates (especially when corrected for heteroskedasticity). Ir appears that the naive forecasr pl predicrs the perfect foresight price pI better than actual stock prices pt do, suggesting that actual prices contain volatile fads or irrational estimates of future dividends.
West's (1988a) test was similar. Denote the expected discounred dividend value by X,. (This is the ex ante counterpart of the ex post price p,*.) tet i denote a set of information available to the market, and H, a subset of f . West proved that
El(xt -E(Xtl H,-'))21 > El(p, -E(p, | /,-' ))21
That is, the market's forecasr of furure prices (on rhe right hand side) should be more accurate, or have lorver variance, than a naive forecast of expected discounted dividend value which uses less information (on the left hand side). If the variance inequality (13) is violated, it suggests there is some unexpected change in prices (like a fad or bubble) thar is unrelated to expecred changes in a simple model of intrinsic value. Notice that (t3) does not require consrruction of a perfect foresight price pl as earlier rests do.
Using past dividends for f/,, West found that (13) was badly violated (rhe righr hand side term was much larger than the left hand side term;. Wesr (1986) also applied this test to Meese's data on foreign exchange rates (described in Section 3 above) and concluded that exchange rates were not excessively volatile, the opposite of Meese's conclusion rhat bubbles exisred.2e Mattey and Meese (1986) studied the econometric propenies of 24 tesr statistics, including those used by Mankiw et al and West, in excruciating detail. They frnd evidence of excessive volatility (compared to a constant discount rare model) and they lean toward the explanation that discount rates vary in rime. Campbell and Shiller (1987) conducted vector autoregression (VAR) tests of the discounted dividend model. VAR's are useful because they give a measure of economic signifrcance of deviations from rationality, they yield implicir variance inequality tests, and they are robust to non-stationarity in prices or dividends. They use results from the theory of cointegration (Engle and Granger, 1987) to correct problems in the VAR when it is applied to stationary firsr differences in prices or dividends. Using a constant discount rate of 8.290, they found large violations of the discounted dividend model, but violations were much smaller with a 3.2s/o rate. Campbell and Shiller also ran regressions of pi against pt. If CAMERER prices anticipate future dividends rationally, the regression coefficients should be I but they were acrually close to 0 for stocks, and 0.8 for bonds (Scott, 1985 , found similar results).
I .4. Methodological problems
There are rwo kinds of objections to the results of these three recent tests (and to the earlier tests as well).
(l) Ir is difhcult ro judge the statistical significance of the variance inequality violations. Merton (1987) showed for a simple case that the standard deviarion of Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro's test statistic grows faster than the test statistic does, without bound, as the sample period increases. Therefore, we cannot draw any conclusions about statistical significance of their results. Campbell and Shiller (1987) estimated the standard errors of the variances in their variance inequaliry test, and they were quite large. West 11988a) estimated significance by simulation. He found that results as extreme as those he observed were very unlikely if stock prices were rational, so his results appear to be significant.
(2) The observed excess volatility could be due to variation in discount rates. (This possibility looms large as an alternative explanation to all evidence of fads, and will probably be the appropriate focus of much future research.) However, to explain the degree of volatility he observed Shiller (l98la) estimated that the annual srandard deviation of real interest rates would have to be about 590; West estimared that the standard deviation of expected returns would have to be l2s/0. This esrimates seem implausibly high (Conrad and Kaul, 1988 , report expected return standard deviations around 20lo\ but without a theoretical model to compare them to, the issue is unresolved. Shiller (1986b, p.502 ) also noted that some changes in discount rates should affect bonds, housing, and stocks simultaneously; but the prices of those assets do not seem to move together.
Messages in the entrails
Two conclusions emerge from the combative debate about variance inequalities: (i) Stock prices do fluctuate more than perfect foresight prices (calculated with constant discount rates), as if prices consist of rational expectations of perfect foresight prices ond mean-reverting fads; and (ii) prices might appear to fluctuate excessively even if they were rational, because of small-sample bias, nonstationariry of dividends, or variation in discount rates. Marsh and Merton ( 1986) thus concluded that the null hypothesis of rationality was not rejected (the case for irrationality was 'unproven'). Shiller (1986a) concluded that the null hypothesis of irrationality was not rejected either.30
The conclusion to be drawn from the data obviously depends upon the choice of null hypothesis. Believers in rationality argue that taking fads to be the null hypothesis 'has the potential to destroy much of 2 decades of knowledge of stock prices' (Kleidon, 1986b, p. Sa92) .rr But unpredictable fads are constsrenr with the decades of previous research. If prices are ahvays equal to rational expectations of future dividend streams (discounred at a constant rate), then prices will only change rvith the arrival of new information, unpredictably (Samuelson, 1965) . Rationality of prices therefore implies unpredicrabilitv of price changes; the studies of 'marker efficiency' rhat Kleidon alluded ro do provide ample evidence of unpredictabiliry (e.g., Fama, 1970 Fama, , 1976 .
However, unpredictability does nor necessarily imply rarionality. Prices could be unpredictable if atl information is incorporated in prices and prices are affected by an unpredictable fad componenr (e.g., Friedman, 1984) . By analogy, imagine a baseball crowd that cheers every hit, and unpredictably bursrs into fads of random cheering or silence. We can accept the hypothesis that hirs cause cheers even though some cheers are not caused by hits.
ln the same way, we can accept the hypothesis that informarion is efficienrly incorporated into prices while also believing that prices are somerimes driven by fads (provided the fads are unpredictable).
Even if fads are somewhat predictable, the degree of market inefficiency they produce, as measured by annual excess returns from betting on the fad to end for instance, may be no larger than other apparenr violations of inefficiency, like the tendency of small frrms to earn excess returns early in January (Keim, 1983) , or the tendency of frrms that have lost market value to 'bounce back' early in January (deBondt and Thaler, 1989) . Shiller (1986a, p. 5502 ) lamenred rhat economists who mention fads 'are viewed as if they were bringing up astrology or extrasensory perception'. His plea is simply for fads to be discussed. scientifically. tt is certainly too early to rejecr the null hypothesis of rationality, but it may not be too early to take faddish irrarionality as a null hypothesis and design tesrs to rejecr it.
Beliefs fads in overreactions to individual stocks
Evidence that stock prices overreacr in belief fads comes from studies with individual stocks, by Thaler (1985, 1987) . They found rhar stocks, with the largest price declines ('losers') bounced back and earned positive excess returns, and stocks with the largest price increase ('winners') earned negative returns. Their basic results have been replicated with American and foreign data (see De Bondt, forthcoming, and De Bondt and Thaler, 1989 , for reviews).
Some of the losers are firms that have lost value so they are small in market value, and most of their excess return occurs in January. Therefore, the performance of loser firms is related to the general finding that small firms earn bigger returns than larger firms in January (Keim, 1983) , though the loser effecr is not entirely explained by the small-firm effect Thaler, 1987: cf. Zarowin, 1988 ). [t is also possible that apparent excess rerurns of losers are caused by underestimates of their risk (Chan, 1988) .
The small-firm and changing-risk explanations aside, De Bondt and Thaler conclude that investors act as if surprisingly low or high earnings are permanenr, but extreme earnings actually tend to regress to the mean (Brooks and CAMERER Buckmaster, I 97 6). The human tendency to overreact t.o data that are statistically imperfect, or [o be surprised by regression, has been documented in many other settings by psychologists (see Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982) . (lndeed, the psychologists' evidence was the basis on which De Bondt and Thaler predicred the anomaly they found.)
There is lots of other evidence of short-term reversals (i.e., negative autocorrelation) in returns (e.g., Lehmann, 1988) . These reversals are important because it is unlikely that risk changes enough in a day or a week to explain rhe reversals. See De Bondt and rhaler's (1989) review for more details.
Tests of stationarity in asset prices
If stock prices are rational forecasts, price changes should have a consranr conditional mean (which implies independence), and prices should follow a martingale (of which a non-srarionary random walk is a special kind). If prices changes are not independent, prices are driven by fads (or by variation in expected returns).
Early studies tested whether prices were non-stationary by conducting runs tests or examining autocorrelation of price changes. These tesrs concluded thar changes were independent (so prices are a random walk), but the early tests were not powerful for detecting small degrees of dependence. Recent tests, using the ratios of price variances over long and short holding periods, are more powerful. If changes are independent, then the variance of changes over an N-monrh period will equal N times the one-month variance. However, if there is a slight degree of negative (or positive) autocorrelation in changes, then the N-monrh variance will be less (or more) than N times the one-month variance. These rests deliberately use coarsely-sampled data, taking four-month changes, for insrance, even though daily data are available, because if a time series departs slightly from a random walk, that departure is better detected by sampling changes between points far apart in time than by sampling poinrs which are close togerher.
From variance ratios and autocorrelations, Fama and French (1988a) and Lo and MacKinlay (1988) conclude that there is slight posirive aurocorrelation in short-term U.S. stock price changes, and slight negative aurocorrelation in longterm changes. Poterba and Summers (1988) replicated these resulrs wirh data from the U.S. and l7 other cduntries. Stock prices do not follow a random walk.
As with excess volatility tests, these results could be explained by changes in expected returns. lndeed, Lo and MacKinley (1988) conclude that rheir data are distinct evidence of fads in returns rather than fads in prices.l2 Keim and Stambaugh (1986) also found that stock and bond rerurns could be partially predicted by observable variables, suggesting predictable variation that might be the basis of returns fads.
Distinguishing between fads and bubbles
In the theory section 2 and 4, a distinction was drawn between rational growing bubbles and irrational fads. Both could exist: simply add the bubble rerm in (3) ro the fad model (7): but they are disrincr phenomena which are often confused or deliberately combined. rl Part of the confusion is empirical: if stochastic bubbles do not live long enough to grow large they look a lot like fads (Meese. 1986 , gives simulated examples in his Table l) . Direct estimation and diagnostic tests for bubbles are probably not very powerful ar distinguishing berrveen bubbles and fads (called 'near bubbles' by West, l9g6).
Since growing bubbles are rational and fads are not, ir is natural to wonder whether the apparent excess volatility in srock prices could be due to rational bubbles (e.g., Fishcer, 1984; Kleidon, l9g6b, pp. 5493-494; Merron, l9g7; Stambaugh, 1986) . However, bubbles seem an unlikely explanation for several reasons. Mankiw, Romer, and Shapiro (19g5, p.6gl ) and Flood and Hodrick (1986) pointed out that most variance inequality results use rhe actual stock price in the last year of the sample as a proxy for rhe perfect foresight price (since future dividends are not known, so an ex post perfect foresight price cannot be calculated). A price bubble at the end of the sample will therefore affect both the actual price and the (assumed) perfect foresighr price, so a bubble will nor make actual prices appear more volatile than the perfect foresight price. (However, bubbles will cause excessive volatility if they exisr early in the sample and burst before the end.)
Shiller (l98lb, p.294) also noted that the dividend-to-price rario ,shows no particular trend' in his data, while the bubble model predicts rhis rario will fall as prices grow exponenrially away from dividends. Shiller (1979) also found excessive volatility in bond returns; but bonds are finitely-lived assers which cannot exhibit rational bubbles, by backward inducrion. Campbell and Shiller's (1987) test explicitly ruled out bubbles because differences of srock prices and dividends are assumed to be stationary (and they will nor be srarionary if bubbles exist). Finally, rational bubbles cannot be negative, while casual evidence from asset markets (and graphs of pr against ph suggesrs fads of asser underpricing do occur.
So fads' not rational bubbles, probably account for any excess volatility in stock prices. Nonetheless, further efforts ro disringuish bubbles and fads empirically could be useful because the causes underlying them are differenr.
Information bubbles: Theory and evidence
When traders have different information or differenr models of their economic world, it is possible for prices to deviate from inrrinsic value (based on rheir pooled information) in what we might call "informarion bubbles". Of course. such deviations can be perfectly rational3o but they may not be.
Agents have difierent information: Theory
Since the intrinsic value of an asset is its value conditioned on information available to all traders, if prices do not reveal all informarion rhen prices deviate from intrinsic value and an information bubble exists.
26 cAMERER
The earliest work on whether prices aggregare informarion showed that prices could completely aggregate (or 'fully reveal') information, in theory (Kihlstrom and Mirman, 1975; crossman, r9j6; Grossman and Stiglitz, l9g0) . prices reveal information because uninformed traders can learn what insiders know, if they know the relationship between information and prices, by observing prices and using Bayes' rule to infer what information caused those prices.
Unfortunately, prices rhat perfectly aggregate information are paradoxical, because if prices reveal all information then traders have no incentive to invest in information-gathering. There are several ways to resolve this paradox, and most of these ways suggest that prices will depart from intrinsic value, in information bubbles (which are typically temporary, and possibly small in size).
One resolution of the paradox is to suppose that some source of noise, like liquidity-motivated trading, muddies the warers of the market so that information and prices are not perfectly linked and prices do not reveal information perfectly (see Hellwig, 1980; and Diamond anC Verrechia, lggl) .
Another resolution of the paradox comes from modelling the process by which prices reveal information. In the fully-revealing models price-serting is Walrasian, so traders are allowed to observe hypothetical prices and infer information from those prices without actually trading. In a more realisric model, early trades which reveal information are actually consummared (Dubey, Ceanakoplos, Shubik, 1987; Kyle, 1985) . Traders have an incenrive to garher information because early trades are profitable. Since early trades do not reflect the aggregation of information, rhey conrain informarion bubbles. In a similar model, Friedman and Aoki (1986) show that noise and sluggishness in the process of changing beliefs can cause prices to deparr from rrue value remporarily. Their 'overshooting bubbles' have momentum: an increase in rhe bubble is more likely to be followed by another increase than by a decrease: but departures are selflimiting because the probability of a reversal increases as the depalure grows larger.
A specific kind of information bubble might arise when no rrader has any information, but traders do not know that nobody has any informarion. Noisy trades may spark erroneous inferences of informarion from prices, which lead ro further disequilibrium trading by traders who think rhey have learned somerhing from prices, which leads to more erroneous inferences, and so on. Traders may end up thinking they have inferred inside informarion, even if there is no information to infer ! Camerer and Weigelr (1988) call these information bubbles 'mirages', because people think they see information which is not there. difficult to know whether prices incorporate all information or not. In one clever test, Schwert (1981) and Huberman and Schwert (1985) tested whetier bond and stock prices responded to public announcements of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). [t is well known that stock and bond prices are affected by unexpected inflation (e.g., Fama, l98l) . Since all the price observations used to consrrucr rhe CPI 'market basket' are publicly observable before the announcement of the CPI, in theory prices could aggregate the information in the CPI before rhe announcement is made. They found that prices were somewhat affected by the announcement. so information was not completely aggregated (though most of the information was anticipated).
Excess trading-hour volatility
Oldfreld and Rogalski (1980), French and Roll (1986) , and others have found that asset prices are much more volatile during trading hours than during non-trading hours, suggesting the existence of information bubbles. The rario of per-hour trading-hour volatility to per-hour weekend volatility, for instance, is about 70 to l. Of course, more news is announced during trading hours than during nontrading hours, but the difference between trading-hour and non-rrading hour volatilities seems too large to be explained purely by the difference in the amount of news. Trading-hour volatility is also high in the orange juice futures market, which is highly dependent on weather that is 'announced' at night when the market is closed. Perhaps the most convincing data are from weeks in 1968 when rhe exchanges were closed on Wednesdays due to a paperwork backlog. Assuming the same amount of news was generated on these closed Wednesdays as on Wednesdays when the market was open, the weekly variances of price changes should be about the same in closed-Wednesday weeks and open-Wednesday weeks. But closedWednesday weeks actually have about 8390 as much variance as open-Wednesday weeks, suggesting the number of days the exchange is open is rhe most important determinant of volatility. One bit of evidence for the theory rhat news generares volatility comes from dollar-yen exchange rates in American markers, where the ratio of trading-hour to non-trading-hour volatility is onty 3 to I (Meese, t986, p.347) . That low ratio suggests a lot of volatility occurs during non-tradinghours because of Japanese news that is announced when American markets are closed. French and Roll (1984) suggest trading-hour volatility mighr be high because trading is 'self-generating': observed trades lead to further trades, creating 'mini-speculative bubbles'. The fact that these mini-bubbles seem to occur disproportionality during hours when traders can observe each other suggests they are information bubbles (mirages, perhaps, or the overshooting bubbles of Friedman and Aoki (1986) ) or short-lived fads, rarher rhan rational growing bubbles. The fact that price movements of individual stocks are only weakly related to market movements, even on days when idiosyncratic news events are excluded (Roll, 1988) , is consisrent with this view.
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Experiments on information aggregation
Asset market reactions to CPI news and evidence of excessive trading-hour volatility are only indirect evidence of informarion bubbles, since we are never quite certain what information is available to whom in natural markets. Therefore. experiments are a fruitful source of evidence about information bubbles because the information that traders have can be controlled. In mosr experiments prices aggregate information well: after several trading periods of experience, there are usually no information bubbles (or they vanish quickly, in a minure or less after information is released). See Plott and Sunder (1982) , Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon (1984) . Banks (1985) , Copeland and Friedman (1986) . Plott and Sunder (1988) found many informarion bubbles in markets with three states (call them X, Y, and Z) in which some traders gor information of the form'X or I'and others learned'Y or Z'. Since the traders'information is individually imperfect but collectively perfect, prices should fully reveal the state, but did not. However, Forsythe and Lundholm (1986) found rhat information bubbles disappeared in the Plott-Sunder setting when rhere were more traders and more trading periods. Camerer and Chernew (1988) found thar information bubbles disappeared if some rraders were told 'X or Y in rhe beginning of a trading period and others were told 'Y or Z' in rhe middle of a trading period.
In experiments designed to test for informarion mirages, Sunder (1988) found several mirages, Camerer and Weigelt (1988) found a few mirages (rhough their incidence diminished quickly with trader experience), and Ang and Schwarz (1985) found no mirages. In experiments by Friedman and von Borries (1988) , there was only one informed trader (and everyone knew thar); mirages were common, presumably because there was no competition among informed traders causing information ro leak our. Camerer and Chernew (1988) conducted experimenrs in which the amount of time the market was open varied, but the amount of news was held constanr. They found little evidence that self-generating rrading caused information bubbles.
Agents have dffirent models
In theories in which agents have fundamenrally different models, the inreracrion between classes of agents can produce information bubbles. For insrance, Campbell and Kyle (1986) test a variant of Kyle (1985 ) (cf. Shiller, 1984 , in which there are noise traders and 'smarl money' traders with rational expectations. They estimate that about a quarter of the variance of price changes is due to noisy trading which pushes prices away from intrinsic value. (That finding is roughly comparable to French and Roll's 1986 , estimare that between 4 and l2o/o of stock price volatility is due to self-generaring trading.) De Long et al (1987) have a similar model of noise trading. Some agents trade on the basis of 'noise' (worthless information); others know better. Smart traders do not necessarily correct pricing errors caused by noise traders, because the noise traders create a special kind of risk smart traders do not want to bear. They give some examples of empirical anomalies which can be explained by rhe existence of noise traders (including excess volatility of prices, the extraordinary excess return of equities over bonds, discounts to closed-end mutual funds and premia to privately-held firms, and effects of dividend and capital structure policy).
In Levine's (1982 ) catastrophe-theoretical model (cf. Zeeman, 1974 , there are classes of traders who use decision rules which are reasonable but suboptimal: chartists forecast price changes based on past changes, etc. This model can account for some features of stock market activity around the Great Depression: Large price changes are more likely to be decreases than increases; prices rise more often than usual after 4-8 point rises following a decline; and price rises are more likely after two or three previous price rises. However, these empirical frndings are only marginally significant, and could be accounted for by many of the bubble and fad models described earlier. Frankel and Froot (1985) have a model of foreign exchange in which rhere are 'fundamentalist' and 'chartist' traders who use simple decision rules, and there is a class of portfolio managers who simply weight the opinions of the fundamentalists and chartists based on their past success in forecasting. For plausible parameter values, their model can account for the apparently unreasonable strength of the dollar in the 1980's.
Models in which different groups of agents interact are quire appealing, bur they have drawbacks. Since there are usually many free parameters in rhese models, they are difficult to test squarely against compering theories. And research on judgment error suggests most people, both dumb and smart, are prone to make systematic errors depending on the context they are in; the world is not neatly divided into noise traders and smart traders. There have been roo few attempts to integrate results of judgment research directly inro noise trader models (see Shefrin and Statman, 1988) . More theory and empirical work along these lines should therefore prove useful.
Conclusion
The idea that asset prices might deviate from intrinsic values has intrigued economists for a long time. I have distinguished three reasons why prices might deviate: Rational growing bubbles, fads, and informarion bubbles.
ln the past two decades theorists have shown that under many conditions prices can exhibit growing bubbles, which are self-fulfrlling and hence rarional. The theory of rational bubbles is fairly conclusive (especially abour the conditions under which rational bubbles cannot occur) but empirical tests for bubbles are not so conclusive. Tests often suggest bubbles do occur, but a bubble is necessarily defined relative to some specifrcation of intrinsic value; an apparenr bubble could be a specification error. Some tests also suffer from problems caused by doing regression on growing bubbles terms, and all tests appear ro have little power to distinguish between growing rational bubbles and long-lived 29 30 CAVIERER irrational fads. Data from experiments in which intrinsic value is controlled show that rarional bubbles can occur, and near-rational bubbles are common rvhen subjects are inexperienced.
Prices may also deviate from intrinsic values because of fads, caused by socially-determined swings in utiliry from owning assers or in beliefs abour true intrinsic values. Fads are not well understood theoretically, but there have been many empirical studies of them. Tests of the volatility of stock prices, and indirect tests for autocorrelation in price changes, generally show that stock prices are not rational forecasts of perfect foresight prices (constructed ex posr, assuming constant discount rates). (These rests are controversial and subtle: the curious reader is encouraged to read the papers cited in section 5.) These apparenr deviations from rational forecasts could be due to fads, or to changes in discounr rates. There are good cases for both hypotheses, and a clear need for more research. If fads do exisr, they beg for theoretical explanation.
A third kind of deviation occurs when all informarion is nor incorporated into prices. Such "information bubbles" might accounr for the small temporary price swings that are evidenced by the large volatility of prices during rrading hours on organized exchanges (relative to the implicit volatility during non-trading hours). These data suggest that trading is ar least parrly 'self-generating'
i.e. informarion bubbles are caused by traders overreacting or making imperfect inferences from observed trading of others. Simple experiments show lirrle evidence of informarion bubbles, but richer settings with more complicated features of natural markers will prove more conclusive.
Most of the research described in this review is quite recenr. As good research tends to do, it collectively raises more questions than it answers. My personal views, shared by some, 15 are that several new directions will prove useful: theories of near-rational fads or bubbles (which are sensible but nor fully rational); data from assets other than stocks and bonds (on housing see Case and Shiller, 1988, in press ); more study of non-price data, especially trading volume; and more data from experiments in which intrinsic values and discounr rares are controlled.
BUBBLES AND FADS tN ASSET PRICES Notes l. For example, Tirole (1982) , Evans (1986) , and Aoki and Friedman (1985) all use the term 'bubble' to describe what we shall call growing bubbles, fads, and informarion bubbles, respectively. Each of these reseachers defines the term'bubble'carefully, bur confusion may result when their work get discussed and their precise usages are forgotten. 2. More formal derivations are given by Blanchard and Watson 11982), Diba and Grossman (1982) , and Tirole (1982) . 3. Since we are assuming risk-neutrality, equation (l) omirs the marginal uriliry of consumption terms from prices and dividends. See Flood, Hodrick, and Kaplan ( t986) for a more careful treatment. 4. Bubbles are ruled out by the 'transversality condition', rhe limit of E(P,,il l,)l(l + r)''' as i becomes infinite is zero, but there is typically no a priori reason to impose this condition. 5. lntrinsic value is more slippery than it might appear. In (3), it depends on both the information s€l /r and the discount rate (or expected rerurn) r. When agenrs have different information sets (or form different beliefs based on the same informarion. see Harrison and Kreps, 1978) , and when discount rates vary over time or agents, intrinsic value is an amalgam of discounted dividend streams determined by exchange. In practice, it may be difhcult to disentangle observed prices from unobserved inrrinsic value, but it can still be useful to speculate about deviations from inrrinsic value. 6. Stochastic bubbles of this form have an expecred life of llp periods, so rhey consriture a probabilistic answer to a question posed by Samuelson (1957) : 'Of course. history tells us that all tulip manias have ended in finite time... Every bubble is some day pricked. But I have long been struck by the fact, and puzzled by ir too, rhar in all the arsenal of economic theory we have absolutely no way of predicring how long such a "Stage (i)" (bubble) will last.' 7. Harrison and Kreps (1978) point out that if traders have heterogeneous opinions, based on the same information, then the intrinsic value is poorly-defrned because each trader will have a different perceived intrinsic value. Trading opportuniries permir speculation -buying in anticipation of selling to somerhing wirh a higher perceived intrinsic value -and make market prices higher than rhe prices that would resuk if people could not resell. When I speak of the intrinsic value, this market price (absent bubbles) is what I have in mind. 8. Their'Breeder's Cup'programme sponsors single day of racing for Sl0 million in purses, and adds abour the same amount to various races throughout the year. The prestigious Kentucky Derby, by contrast, is worth abour 5500,000 to rhe winner. 9. Some of the yearling bubble can be accounted for by rich oil sheikhs eager to buy Kentucky Derby winners. At the height of the bubble, one group of four brorhers flew to the Lexington summer sales in their 747 and spenr $60 million in cash for yeariings. 10. ln a pyramid game, players pay money for the right to collect several times as much money when several others are persuaded to join the pyramid and contribute. Such a scheme is a bubble wirh no dividend, equarion (3) with P, = Bt. Pyramids break down because they require a rate of growth of new players rhar is impossible ro sustain. Such schemes are generally illegal and highly popular. ll. ln January 1980, accounts controlled by the Hunts held claims on 5090 of the deliverable silver inventory at the Comex and 7090 at rhe Chicago Board of Trade (Abolafra and Kilduff, 1988). 12. Taylor imagines 'some dominant group (the governmenr?) poinring the way toward those self-fulfilling expectations which have the highest expected utility'. This hope, Shiller (1978) 
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Price bubbles are ruled out because prices should never exceed rhe price level ar which it pays to 'cash in' currency ior capital. By backward induction, bubbles should never begin. Note that the stochastic bubbles mentioned above. rvhich might burst rvirh probabiliry p each period, do not necessarily end so the unravelling argument doesn't apply. For instance, suppose traders have a probabilitv of dying each period (which ihey know) which increases each period. 'Old' traders wirh high probabilities of death have discount rates which are higher than the market discount rates which determine rhe bubble's growth rate, so buying the bubble has negarive discounted expected value for them. They'll quit and rerire. Tirole also pointed out (pp. 1090-1093) that an asser's intrinsic value depends upon how it is used, so a speculative bubble can therefore affecr intrinsic value (if gold is held in a safe, for instance). This is akin to the problem of non-exhausrion of a nonrenewable resource. For instance, Roll (1986) suggested managerial 'hubris'explains why frrms earn no gains from takeovers. And a majority of automobile drivers say rhey are better rhan average, even those interviewed in hospitals after accidents (Svenson, l98l) .
In economics experiments where subjects were paid several dollars if rhey predicted their rank in trading profits correctly, 9090 guessed rhey were in rhe rop 50go in earnings (Camerer, 1987) . Holding the asset or winning the auction informs traders that they have higher values of ?"i (or %) than other people, and they should revise their esrimares downward ro account for the information about the estimates of orhers rhat is implicirly conveyed by holding (or winning). Trading before one is born is not so absurd as it seems. If members of families have dependent utility functions, a mother gets urility from her daughter's consumprion for instance, parents might rationally trade on behalf of their children before rhev are born. An example might be the Hong Kong stock marker, which rose l0 times in value between 1970 and 1973, then dropped 7590 in a year. These enormous price swings might indicate a bubble or fad, or they could be rational swings based on changing beliefs about what will happen when Hong Kong reverrs to China after the British lease expires in 1997. Excessive kurtosis is induced because the distributions of returns or price changes will have changing variance over the bubble 'life cycle'. Mixing low and high-viriance observations by sampling across the life cycle will creare more large observarions (from the high-variance periods) than in a normal distribution. The bubble is not quite rational, because subjecrs' initial bubble belief stemmed from their misconception that the long-lived asset marker should necessarily behave like the one-period asset market. (Their belief is not rarional in Murh's sense of being consistent with the correct economic model.) But their beliefs, regardless of origin, were self-fulfrlling. 24-For example, Shiller (1984) argued that 'perceptions of return themselves represenr changing fashions.'See also Schachter et at (1985b) on rhe social psychology of rhe stock market. For instance, if utility fads occur because people get utility from discussing rheir asser holdings with others, then well-known stocks will be more faddish than unknown stocks. Belief fads may be more common when there is more uncertainty about intrinsic value: in new issues of common stock, for instance. Other hypotheses of this sort are not hard to imagine. Sociology and anthropology might be useful for understanding urility fads (e.g., Douglas and Isherwood, 1978) ; social and cognirive psychology for belief fads (e.g., Schachter etal, 1985b) ; and the psychology of rime preference for returns fads (e.9., Loewenstein, 1987) .
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27. Recall from basic statistics that sample variances alrvavs underesrimare true population variances. hence the iamiliar need to divide by n -I rather than n lrvhen data are independent). When data are seriallv correlated, rhe degree of underestimation bias is much worse. lf pl is smoother than p,, rhe degree oi underestimation will be grearer |or pi rhan for p,, so pi mav appear ro varv less than p, purely because of bias in estimaring their variances. 28. Shiller said his dividend series is stationary, since a regression of log dividends against lagged log dividends and a time variable yielded a coetficient estimate of 0.807 (see also Blanchard and Watson. 1982. and West, 1988) . But Kleidon (1986c) accepred rhe hypothesis of non-stationarity, using only data from 1926 on because of concerns about errors in older data. and Marsh and Merton (1987) concluded rhat a nonstationary Lintner-type model fit better than stationary auroregressive models. LeRoy and Parke (1987) concluded that dividends follow a geometric random walk rarher than a stationary process with a time trend. but their simulations indicate rhe trvo processes are difhcult to distinguish statisticallv. (The variance-bound is nor violared in their test when a geomerric random walk is assumed.) 29. West (1986) speculated that the difference in his 1986 test and Meese's resr (which used West, 1987) is that the volatility test (13) is more robust to rvirhin-sample changes in market fundamentals. and therefore more conclusive. 30. Shiller (1986a, pp. 5504-505) : 'lntuitively, it is hard to see how a model that makes f,* roughly a trend with p bounced around this trend by fashions or fads could ever be rejected by these data in favour of a model that says price movemenrs anricipare dividends.' 31. Kleidon reports that graduate students and courrs may nor use srock prices as measures of frrm value if they think prices contain fads. But mosr 'faddists'conrend that prices react to information and to fads; prices are not perfect indicators of true value but they should be used. Should faddists whisper about t'ads models just to prevent students and lawyers from hearing and misinrerprering them? 32. Fads in prices will create negative autocorrelations. while fads in rerurns creare positive autocorrelations. Lo and MacKinlay suspecr that the negative autocorrelations Fama and French (1988) observed in long-rerm rerurns might be less statistically reliable than the positive autocorrelations in short-term rerurns, because long-term returns are ferver in number and appear more sensitive to choice of sampling period. 33. For example, in a discussion of Shiller (1984) , Fischer (1984) says new sratistical resrs 'will also in all likelihood be more closely related to the speculative bubble lirerarure than to the fads literature -if indeed those approaches are ultimarelv differenr'. 34. For instance, stock market insiders may know the true intrinsic value (based on pooled information) is different from the market price. and I may know that they know, bur none of us can do any better than we are by knowing rhere is such a bubble. 35. E.g., Tirole (1982 , p. ll80), Shiller (1984 , Black (1986) , and Merton (t987).
